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AbStrACt
From the height of system-of-systems combat and operational perspective, the operations of cognitive electronic 
warfare (CEW) was analysed, and its main process and links were described. Secondly, the jamming effectiveness 
evaluation (JEE) model of cognitive electronic attack (CEA) operations was established based on the interference 
side, in which the change of threat degree was used as the measure index of jamming effectiveness. Then, based on 
the Q-learning model, an intelligent countermeasure strategy generation (ICSG) model was established, and the main 
steps in the model were given. Finally, on the basis the JEE model and the ICSG model, the simulation experiment 
was carried out for CEA operations. The result showed that combining the JEE model with the ICSG model can 
express the main process of the operations of CEW, as well as proved the validity of these models. 
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1. IntroduCtIon
The design of the new operational concept of cyber 
war operations is a powerful driving force to promote the 
development of the equipment system, as well as the innovation 
of the tactic and operational method of cyber war. Cognitive 
electronic warfare (CEW) operational concept, technology and 
equipment system are important support for strengthening the 
cyberspace capacity building in the US “Third Offset Strategy”1. 
The progress of the research and the application of combat 
are being widely concerned by the domestic and international 
professionals in the cyberspace. By carrying out the modelling 
and simulation of CEW to the high-level operational concept 
under the background of joint operations, it will be able to 
promote the research of combat theory, equipment systems and 
key technologies of CEW. 
At present, there are few research results on CEW at 
home and abroad, focusing on two aspects: First, from the 
qualitative analysis, the professionals analyse the basic 
concepts, functional components and operational applications 
of CEW2,3. Zhang2 analyses the characteristics of CEW and the 
possible technical composition from the perspective of single 
platform, which lays a foundation for the research of the CEW 
architecture. Zhou3 analyses the intelligent principles of the 
cognitive radio, cognitive radar and typical CEW projects, as 
well as the relationship between CEW and cyber warfare, from 
the perspective of the observation, orientation, decision, action 
combat loop (OODA loop). These articles establish the basis 
of the quantitative analysis of the CEW and let the high-level 
decision makers know the importance of CEW. The second 
is to start from the signal level, the professionals study the 
jamming effectiveness evaluation, intelligent countermeasure 
strategy generation and waveform optimisation4-7. Investigator 
Guang proposes a possible organisation and operation model 
for the cognitive reconnaissance module in CEW, and gives 
two processing procedures of the module, which are proposed 
for the parameter measurement in the frequency domain and the 
spatial domain of the CEW equipment4. Amuru7 has developed 
a new framework to enable the jammer continuously changing 
the jamming strategy in some typical scenarios based on the 
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, where the reward is 
associated with the state transitions rather than itself. These 
achievements drive the development of CEW from different 
specific research fields by a long way.
The type of the systems-of-systems (SoS) confrontation 
is the basic operation model in the future, as well as the joint 
operational SoS is the background and target of CEW. The 
research of modelling and simulation of CEW as a complete 
operational concept from the perspective of SoS confrontation 
is very important, that can facilitate high-level professionals 
understanding of the operational mechanism and technical 
mechanism of CEW operations, recognise the enormous 
combat capability of CEW operations, and highlight the 
operational effects, while the research achievements are rare 
currently. This paper starts with the analysis of CEW from the 
perspective of the OODA loop, and studies the modelling and 
simulation of CEA operations as an important component of 
CEW operations, combining the reinforcement learning model 
with cognitive electronic attack (CEA) operations.Received : 06 March 2019, Revised : 22 December 2019 
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2. opErAtIonAl AnAlySIS of CEW bASEd 
on thE oodA loop
Cognitive electronic warfare operations dynamically 
adjust the attack and protection strategies based on real-time 
environmental situation awareness, operational effectiveness 
assessment, and knowledge learning and accumulation results. 
Through the closed loop of the operational process, intelligent 
and efficient EW will be implemented. CEW operations will 
effectively respond to the complex electromagnetic situation 
in future battlefields. From the operational view analysis, 
CEW operations are subversive and autonomous cyber war 
operations, and the combat process CEW operations conforms 
to the OODA loop model. The analysis of CEW from the 
perspective of OODA helps to understand the whole process 
and key links of CEW, and then guides the modelling of 
CEW operations. From the level of SoS confrontation, CEW 
operations are mainly composed of four processes such as 
“cognitive interception—cognitive processing—cognitive 
decision-cognitive jamming”, and constitute a closed loop 
from reconnaissance to interference and evaluation.
Cognitive interception intercepts the environment 
signals about the targets through the dynamic perception of 
the battlefield electromagnetic environment, and measures 
and stores the signals. With the support of the signal feature 
knowledge base (SFKB), cognitive processing uses signal 
feature mining and other techniques to extract, locate and 
identify signal features, and to perform signal threat assessment 
and judgment. Through unified, standardised knowledge 
engineering, new knowledge of new signal characteristics and 
threats are generated, then the knowledge base is updated. 
Cognitive decision-making, with the support of the jamming 
performance and jamming strategy knowledge base, analyses 
the current target signal characteristics, evaluates the previous 
interference performance, dynamically generates a new and 
more appropriate countermeasure strategy, and updates the 
jamming performance knowledge base (JPKB) and jamming 
strategy knowledge base (JSKB). Cognitive jamming, with 
the support of the power management knowledge base 
(PMKB), reasonably allocates the energy of each jamming 
beam, performs power control and management, and releases 
interference for the target.
In CEW operations, cognitive interception and cognitive 
processing constitute cognitive electronic reconnaissance 
(CER) operations together, while cognitive decision-making 
and cognitive jamming constitute cognitive electronic attacks 
operations (CEA) together. Because cognitive interception 
and cognitive jamming focus on describing the flow and 
utilisation process of signals, they are problems that are 
concerned with signal level modelling and simulation. The 
model resolution is high, which is difficult to describe in 
the SoS confrontation simulation. At the same time, because 
cognitive processing and cognitive decision-making focus 
on the process of generating and utilising information, they 
are problems which are concerned in the SoS-level. The 
model resolution is relatively lower, which can be simplified 
and portrayed in SoS confrontation simulation. The result 
of CER operations is to provide data, information, and 
intelligence support for CEA operations. In this paper, aiming 
at the urgent need of SoS confrontation simulation, CEA 
operation is the main modelling object, and a CEA operation 
model for high-level operational concept demonstration 
is constructed.
3. CEA opErAtIonAl ModEllIng MEthod 
bASEd on rl ModEl
The emergence of CEW technology and equipment has 
changed the form of traditional electronic warfare, so that 
when the CEW equipment performs CEA operations, it can 
continuously “trial and error”, that is, transform the electronic 
attack style, and detect the changes of the signal characteristics 
and working status of the enemy electronic information 
equipment, so as to evaluate the effect of the CEA operations 
online, then continuously adjust the EA style to finally learn 
the best confrontation style under different circumstances. This 
“trial and error” feature of CEA has strong similarities with 
the RL model. In fact, RL is a high level of abstraction of CEA 
operational in the field of machine learning. The head of the 
BAE Josh Niedzwiecki believes that1 “the learning process of 
the CEW system is highly consistent with the RL model, and 
the CEW system adapts to the learning environment through 
RL.”
In view of the similarity between the RL model and the 
CEA operations, the RL model can provide guidance and 
reference for the modelling of CEA. The classical RL model 
is as shown in Fig. 1. The entities of the model includes two 
categories: the agent and the environment. The agent can 
perform actions, while the environment is an interactive object 
whose behaviour is uncontrollable. The main work-flow of the 
agent is as follows: first, the agent observes the environment to 
obtain the state of the environment; secondly, the agent selects 
the action according to a certain policy and interacts with the 
environment to get the reward of the action (Reward). Again, 
the agent repeat the above steps until the end. The work-flow of 
the environment is as follows: first, receiving an action of the 
agent and reacting to the action; secondly, passing the state of 
the environment and the reward of the action to the agent. The 
ultimate goal of the RL model is to maximise the rewards.
According to the RL model, based on the high abstraction 
and generalisation of CEA, a CEA operations model can be 
constructed. The flow chart is as shown in Fig. 2.
figure 1. diagram of rl model.
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The work-flow of the CEA operations model is as 
follows:
Step 1: The CEA operations obtains the emitter descriptor 
word (EDW) generated by the CER operations, which 
is analogous to the state S of the agent acquisition from 
environment in the RL model, and goes to Step 2.
The EDW is used to describe the main parameters 
describing the characteristics of the radiation obtained by the 
process of sorting, identifying, locating and threatening the 
radiation, including radiation position( POS ), pulse width(PW ), 
pulse repetition frequency ( PRI ), radiation system(SYS), 
radiation application( APP ), radiation type(TYPE), radiation 
working state( ST ), and radiation threaten level(TL). 
The BnF form of the EDW  is as Eqn. (1):
EDW ::=< POS >< PW >< PRI >< SYS >
               < APP ><TYPE >< ST ><TL >                      (1)
Step 2: According to the change of the EDW before and 
after the jamming, using the jamming effectiveness evaluation 
(JEE) model which is based on jamming-side perspective 
to valuate the effectiveness of the interference, analogous 
to the agent obtaining the reward R of a certain action, go 
to Step 3.
The available jamming performance evaluation methods 
include jamming-based evaluation methods and jammed- 
based evaluation methods. The evaluation rules include 
information rules, power rules, efficiency rules, etc. The 
influencing factors include power, distance, frequency, timing, 
style, and system, etc.
Step 3: Learning the interference situation, and using 
Intelligent confrontation strategy generation (ICSG) model 
to select a better interference pattern based on the jamming 
strategy, generating an jamming decision description word (
JDDW ), analogous to the policy in the RL model, and going 
to Step 4.
The JDDW is to optimise and control interference 
patterns, interference waveform, and interference resources. 
In view of the requirements of the SoS confrontational and 
simulation, this paper regards the decision of interference 
pattern ( JTYPE ) as the most important interference strategy 
decision content, and can be expressed as the JDDW , which is 
formally described as is as Eqn (2):
JDDW ::=< JTYPE >                                                    (2)
The available reinforcement learning methods are mainly 
various types of model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, 
including Monte Carlo (MC) algorithm and Timeporal 
Differences (TD) algorithm.
Step 4: Generate an interference waveform according 
to the JDDW , optimise the jamming resources, and jam the 
radiation again, analogous to the agent performing action A in 
the RL model.
4. JEE ModEl bASEd on thE JAMMIng-
SIdE prESpECtIvE
Jamming effectiveness evaluation is an important 
guarantee to realize the closed loop of CEW. It transforms the 
information acquired by CER operations into the decision-
making basis needed for cognitive decision-making, and 
provides optimised direction driving for CEA operations. 
Only accurate and correct evaluating interference performance 
can provide the correct feedback for the learning behavior 
of CEA. Interference effectiveness assessment based on the 
interference side perspective is one of the important features of 
CEW advanced in traditional electronic warfare. It is one of the 
important capabilities of CEW to achieve auto countermeasure. 
By detecting of the information and analysing the changes 
of the signal characteristics, behaviour characteristics and 
working state of the radiation, due to the interference, CEA 
operations can evaluate the effectiveness of the jamming 
and provide a quantitative basis for the adjustment of the 
interference pattern. Based on the SoS confrontation level, this 
paper takes radar jamming to one multi-phase array radar ( R ) 
as an example. Based on the existing research results, this 
paper initially explores the JEE model based on the jamming 
side perspective under the SoS confrontation condition.
4.1 Qualitative Analysis of Jamming performance 
and radar State
From a macro perspective, there is a certain mapping 
relationship between interference performance and radar state. 
This is the basis for the modelling of jamming effectiveness 
assessment based on the interference side perspective. When 
the radar R  is in different working states, the interference 
performance of different interference patterns of CEA 
operations may be different, even the interference performance 
of the same jam pattern may be different8,9. Changes of the 
radar’s working state after being disturbed can be used to 
assess whether the jamming is valid.
When the radar R  is in the search state, the effective 
interference makes the radar signal processing and the data 
figure 2. diagram of the process of cognitive electronic attack action model.
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processing unable to detect the target signal normally. At this 
time, the radar R  can only keep the search state unchanged. 
Otherwise, the invalid jamming will not affect the normal 
processing of the target signal by the radar, and the radar R  
will go to the tracking state. When the radar R  is in the tracking 
state, the effective interference will make the radar unable to 
track the target stably, even lose the target, re-enter the search 
state, or maintain the tracking state unchanged. Otherwise, the 
invalid interference will not affect the radar R  tracking of the 
target, then the radar will transfer to identify other false targets 
for imaging, affecting the radar’s imaging process for the target, 
maintaining the recognition status or moving to tracking and 
search status. When the radar R  is in a guided state, effective 
jamming will cause the radar to lose its target or track to other 
targets and move to the tracking state or search state.
The relationship between the interference performance 
and the radar working state can be represented by a state 
transition diagram, as shown in Fig. 3(a).
Assuming that the working state 1S = Search , 2S = Track , 
3S = Identity , 4S = Guide  of the radar R  constitutes a working 
state set { }(1 4)iS S i= ≤ ≤ . Interference patterns include 
1J = Aim , 2J = Block , 3J = Scan , 4J = Distance Cheat ,
5J = Speed Cheat , 6J = Angle Cheat , 7J = Target Cheat , 
which constitute jamming pattern set { }(1 7)iJ = J i≤ ≤ . For 
Fig. 3(a), the state transition matrix can be used for abstract 
drawing, as shown in Fig. 3(b). ST is the state transition matrix, 
and the row and column are all working states. “1” indicates 
that the state (1 4)pS p≤ ≤  of a row can be directly converted 
to the state (1 4)qS q≤ ≤ of a column, while “-1” indicates 
that the state pS  can not be directly converted to the state qS . 
For example, ST(2,3) 1=St  indicates that 2S  can be directly 
converted to the state 3S .
4.2 Jamming performance Evaluation function 
based on threat
At the time t , the CEA operations use the interference 
pattern tJ J∈  to jam the radar radar R  which the working 
state is tS S∈ . After the interference, the CER operations 
detect the radar and obtains the observation 1tO + , and the 
working state of the radar R  change to 1tS S+ ∈ . When the 
interference reduces the threat of the working state (except the 
search state), the jamming is effective. Otherwise, while the 
threat is continuously increased or unchanged, the jamming is 
invalid. Therefore, the change of the radar threat degree due to 
the interference can be used as a measure of the interference 
performance.
This paper defines the jamming performance function 
( )Eff •  which used to calculate the jamming performance of 
tJ . The expression is as shown in Eqn. (3):
1 1 1
1 1
( | , ) ( | , ) ( , )
( | , ) ( ( ) ( ))
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
Eff J S S P S J S R S S
P S J S W S W S
+ + +
+ +
= ×
= × −     (3)
In this Eqn. (3), ( )W •  is the threat degree function, 
indicating the threat degree of the working state of the 
radar. 1( | , )t t tP S J S+  is the effective jamming probability, 
which indicates that when the radar working state is tS , the 
probability that the working state will change to 1tS +  by using 
the interference pattern tJ . 1( | , )t t tP S J S+  can be given by the 
simulation test. 1( , )t tR S S +  is the reward function for work status 
changes, and 1 1( , ) ( ( ) ( ))t t t tR S S W S W S+ += − . In general, when 
the interference is effective, the farther away from the state 
tS  and 1tS + , the smaller the effective interference probability. 
The working state tS  can be obtained by the CER operations 
processing the observation tO , and is included in the radiation 
descriptor tEDW  for the radar R .
If the performance function 1( | , ) 0t t tEff J S S + > , the 
threat level is reduced and the interference pattern tJ  is valid. 
Otherwise, if 1 1( | , ) 0( )t t t tEff J S S S S+ ≤ ≠ , the threat level is 
increased or remains unchanged, and tJ  is invalid. The value 
of the jamming performance function ( )Eff •  is equivalent 
to the reward in RL model, and can provide a basis for the 
optimisation of the jamming action (i.e., the interference 
pattern).
5.  ICSg ModEl bASEd on Q-lEArnIng 
AlgorIthM
The description and construction of the intelligent 
confrontation strategy generation process in the CEA operations 
can drive the CEA operations models auto and autonomously 
in the SoS simulation. The ICSG model is the key and difficult 
point of modelling the CEA operations. Q-learning (QL) 
algorithm proposed by Watkins is an important improvement 
figure 3. (a) diagram of radar working state conversion and 
(b) Matrix of radar working state conversion.
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
S S S S
S
S
ST
S
S
− − 
 − =  
 − 
(b)
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of TD algorithm in RL. Due to its simple algorithm, rapid 
convergence and convenient use, it is widely used and 
regarded as an important milestone in RL development10,11. 
Considering the small amount of sample data and the high real-
time simulation requirements, based on the table Q-learning 
algorithm, this paper only uses the intelligent countermeasure 
strategy for the radar R  as an example, and constructs the 
ICSG model to intelligently generate countermeasures against 
radiation.
5.1 description of the problem
Assume that the working state set S  of the radar R  
is known, and the action a ( a J∈ ) is a certain interference 
pattern. All jamming patterns can be used for any state s , that 
is s S∀ ∈ , ( )A s J= . The Definition of the state-action value 
function ( , )Q s a  is as given in Definition (1).
Definition (1): state-action value function ( , )Q s a
( , )Q s a  is the Q  function, which indicates that when the 
state is s , the expectation of the maximum discount future 
reward obtained after the action a  is performed, and represents 
the quality of a particular action in a given state, as shown in 
Eqn. (4)5:
1
0
( , ) { | , } { | , }kt t t t k t t
k
Q s a E R S s A a E R S s A a
∞
π
π π + +
=
= = = = γ = =∑
 (4)
In Eqn. (4), π  is a strategy, which indicates a rule for 
selecting an action in each state. γ ( 0 1≤ λ ≤ ) is a discount 
factor, which indicates a relative proportion of future rewards. 
tR  is a reward when the state is tS s=  and the action is tA a=
, which can be represented by a rewards function ( , )R s a .
Knowing the threat degree ( )W s  of each state s  and the 
interference function 1( | , )t t tEff J S S + , the goal of the ICSG 
model is to find the optimal strategy ∗π , so that the radar R  
will be finally in the target state 1Es S=  with the greatest 
expected reward regardless of the initial state. 
The task of the ICSG model is to train the Q  function, 
get the best action corresponding to each state, at last form the 
optimal strategy ∗π . When the training is over, any initial state 
ss S∈  is as given, and the optimal action and interference 
pattern can be generated autonomously.
5.2 the Main process of the ICSg Model
The progress of the ICSG model based on Q-learning 
algorithm are as shown in Fig. 4. The main steps of this model 
are as follows.
Step 1: Initialisation Q  function, and going to Step 2.
Due to the number of elements of the radar working state 
set is 4S = , and the number of elements of the jamming 
pattern set is 7J = , so the Q  function is initialised to a 4 7×  
Figure 4. The flow chart of the ICSG model.
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zero matrix, in which the row of the matrix represents the state 
of the radar, and the column represents the action that may be 
taken.
Step 2: When the termination learning rule is met, go to 
Step 8. Otherwise, going to STEP 3.
The termination learning rule includes two rules, one 
is the Q  value convergence rule ( )QStopℜ , the other is the 
iteration time rule ( )QNumℜ . ( )QStopℜ  means that the 
learning process is terminated when the difference between the 
value ( , )Q s a  of the last two experiments is less than or equal 
to the convergence threshold Qρ . ( )QNumℜ  means that when 
the times of experiments is greater than the iterations times 
threshold QN , the learning process is terminated. 
Step 3: According to the results of the CER operations, 
identify the current status of the radar R , go to STEP 4.
Step 4: When the target state 1Es S=  is not reached, go to 
Step 5. Otherwise, go to STEP 2.
Step 5: According to the ε greedy rule ( )Maxℜ ε , select 
the interference pattern tJ  as the action ta  in the jamming 
pattern set J , and go to Step 6.
( )Maxℜ ε  refers to the relationship between the 
exploration of unknown knowledge (randomness) and the use of 
known knowledge (greediness) in the process of reinforcement 
learning, so that the RL process uses both the most rewarding 
actions which is known, and the unknown actions.
Step 6: After performing the action ta (that is after the 
interference pattern tJ  is used to interfere with the radar R
, according to the radar state transition diagram and the result 
of the CER operations on the radar R , the radar working 
state ts  becomes 1ts S+ ∈ ( 1ts +  obtained by the SoS confront 
simulation environment). Iteratively update the value function 
( , )t tQ s a  according to the Bellman equation of Eqn (5) below, 
and go to Step 7.
1( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) max ( , ) ( , )]t t t t t t t t taQ s a Q s a R s a Q s a Q s a+← + α× + γ −
(5)
In this equation, α  is the learning efficiency factor, and 
the reward function is 1( , ) ( | , )t t t t tR s a Eff J s s +=  based on the 
JEE model.
Step 7: Let the status ts  be the current status 1ts + , go to 
Step 4.
Step 8: Output the optimal strategy ∗π  according to 
Eqn (6) and end the process of the ICSG model.
arg max( ( , ))
a
Q s a∗ ∗π =                                                   (6)
6. SIMulAtIon ExpErIMEnt
In the Matlab environment, this paper conducts simulation 
experiments on CEA operations, especially the core model-the 
ICSG model. The result expresses the autonomic decision-
making process of CEA operations under SoS confrontation 
conditions. 
6.1 Simulation Experiment Environment 
Setting
It is assumed that after CER operations, the radiation 
description of the radar R  is EDW  formed by the 
CEW equipment, and the state of the radar R  is ts  after 
the state recognition process. Assume that the time t  is close 
to the time 1t + , the CEW equipment has not widely moved. 
The value of the threat degree ( )W •  is quantified by the expert 
analysis method, such as 1( ) 0W S = , 2( ) 30W S = , 3( ) 70W S = , 
4( ) 100W S = . Therefore, a threat degree transfer matrix 
WR  can be obtained as shown in Eqn. (7). Each element 
( , )(1 , 4)WR x y x y≤ ≤  in this equation represents the threat 
change value when transitioning from state xS  to state yS .
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
100 30 inf inf
30 0 40 inf
70 40 0 30
100 70 inf 0
S S S S
S
S
WR
S
S
− − − 
 − − =  −
 − 
                (7)
Simply, it is assumed that the effects of the seven jamming 
patterns on the radar working state transition are independent 
of the initial state, and the jamming factors of these jamming 
patterns on the state transition are ( ) ( 1) /JamFac i J i J= − + .
Based on the threat degree transfer matrix WR nd the 
jamming pattern influence factor JamFac , the S S J× ×  
third-order jamming performance matrix R WR JamFac= ⊗  is 
constructed as the reward matrix, as shown in Eqn. (8):
( , , ) ( , ) ( )R x y i WR x y JamFac i= ×
                                 
(8)
In the SoS confrontation simulation environment, it is 
necessary to simulate the change of the radar working state 
after the interference. If the jamming is not affected, the radar 
state transition probability matrix PT  can be fixed as shown 
in Eqn. (9) assumingly, which is based on the prior knowledge 
according to some experts in the electronic warfare field, and 
its value can effect the simulation result.
PT 
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
0.3 0.7 0 0
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5
0.05 0.25 0 0.7
S S S S
S
S
S
S
 
 
 =  
 
 
pt
                         
(9)
6.2 Simulation Experiment Conclusion and Analysis
In the experiment, the greedy factor 0.1ε = , the learning 
efficiency factor 0.3α = , the discount factor 0.8γ = , the 
iteration times threshold 10000QN = , and the convergence 
threshold 1Qρ = , the resulting Q  function matrix is as shown 
in Table 1.
According to the Q  function, the final interference 
strategy corresponding to the radar state can be obtained. 
For example, when the radar state is 1S  which represents 
search, the interference strategy 1J  should be selected so as 
table 1. Q function array
Q table J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7
S1 482.67 466.90 447.86 431.98 414.59 404.00 391.18
S2 411.51 408.21 404.23 402.47 397.10 393.62 386.60
S3 366.42 359.25 349.20 343.10 339.91 331.84 324.77
S4 395.71 383.11 376.11 364.33 358.67 344.08 331.98
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figure 5. diagram of the relation between the iteration times 
and the sum of the maximum Q value.
1 1( )S J
∗π =  at this time. It can be seen that the interference 
strategy corresponding to each state at this time is the jamming 
pattern 1J , which is consistent with the good jamming effect of 
the jamming pattern 1J  in any of the preset states. 
To study the influence of the learning factor on the ICSG 
model, the greedy factor 0.1ε = , the discount factor 0.8γ = , the 
iteration number threshold 10000QN = , and the convergence 
threshold 1Qρ = . The learning efficiency factor α  are taken 
as [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0] respectively, then the relationship 
between the sum of the maximum Q  value of the states and 
the learning efficiency factor-the number of iterations in the Q  
value function matrix is obtained, as shown in Fig. 5. 
action matrix is big, and the radar working state is continuously 
transferred according to the state transition probability. 
In the future, deep Q network technology can be used to 
cope with more complex state-action spaces and improve 
iteration speed.
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From the overall trend of each curve, the larger the learning 
efficiency factor, the larger the sum of the maximum Q value, 
and the better the overall interference effect of the “trial and 
error” process. At the same time, the timing of the inflection 
points of each curve is not much different. The simulation shows 
that the learning efficiency factor can influence the impression 
of the ICSG model, deciding the best learning effect, while has 
little effect on the learning speed.
To sum up, this simulation experiment shows that the 
ICSG model based on the Q-learning algorithm can express 
the main process of CEA operations, as well as the influence 
of the learning efficiency factor. The experiment verifies the 
effectiveness of the ICSG model, the JEE model and some 
algorithms proposed in this paper.
7.  ConCluSIonS
CEW closely combines artificial intelligence technology 
with electronic warfare technology, greatly improving the 
operational effectiveness and changing the “rules of the 
game” of electronic warfare. In this paper, based on the 
requirements of SoS confrontation simulation and combat 
concept demonstration, the main processes of CEA operations 
are analysed from the perspective of OODA loop. The JEE 
model based on interference side view and the ICSG model 
based on Q-Learning are established, and initially realised 
the modelling and simulation of CEA operations. The whole 
simulation experiment time is about 5.2s and is a little slow to 
generate the jamming strategy in real-time. Because the state-
